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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Desirae Amanda Tracy appeals from the district court's order denying her
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement officers'
warrantless entry into her apartment.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The facts underlying Tracy's motion to suppress, based on the testimony
of officers during the preliminary hearing and suppression motion hearing, were
determined by the district court as follows (with references to the record in
brackets):
On February 25, 2012, at approximately 9:45 a.m., Boise
City Police Officer Billie Cox was dispatched to 2834 S. Robert
Lane, Boise for a domestic disturbance call. [Tr., p.12, L.17 - p.13,
L.1 _Jf1 1 According to the dispatcher, the calling party reported there
was a female being thrown in the apartment, there was lots of noise
and sounds of banging from the apartment. [Tr., p.13, Ls.1-6.]
According to the caller, there had been prior disturbances and the
caller was concerned for the children.
[Tr., p.13, Ls.7-12.]
According to the dispatcher, the male had left the residence. [Tr.,
p.13, Ls.13-18.] Officer Cox arrived with another officer, Boise
Police Officer Kirk Rush. [Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.3.]
Officer Cox knocked on the front door. [Tr., p.33, Ls.20-22.]
Desirae answered the door. [Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5; p.33, Ls.23-25.]
Desirae told Officer Cox there had been an argument, but that
everything was fine. [Tr., p.14, Ls.6-8; Prelim. Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.6,

The transcript of the suppression motion hearing will be referred to as "Tr.",
and the transcript of the preliminary hearing will be referred to as "Prelim. Tr."
The state requested the district court to consider the preliminary hearing
testimony in deciding Tracy's suppression motion, and after defense counsel
stated he had no objection, the court considered the preliminary hearing
testimony in making its suppression determination. (Tr., p.39, Ls.4-14; see R.,
p.95 ("The preliminary hearing transcript is in the Court file, and the Court has
reviewed the testimony.").)
1

1

L.2; p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.1.] Desirae told Officer Cox that her
husband had left the residence, and that she was there with her two
children. [Tr., p.14, Ls.6-8; Prelim. Tr., p.5, Ls.2-7.] Officer Cox
could see one child from the doorway. [Tr., p.15, Ls.4-13.] Officer
Cox asked for permission to come in and make sure everyone was
okay. [Tr., p.15, Ls.14-15.] Desirae declined, but volunteered to
bring the other child for Officer Cox to observe. [Tr., p.15, Ls.1618.] Desirae brought the other child, an eight (8) or nine (9) months
old infant, to the front door. [Tr., p.17, Ls.13-19.] Officer Cox could
see red marks on the child's face, stomach, and arms. [Tr., p.17, L.
21 - p.18, L.8.] Officer Rush saw the same red marks. [Prelim. Tr.,
p.6, Ls.8-11.] Officer Cox questioned Desirae about the marks and
Desirae said the marks were from sleeping and would disappear.
[Tr., p.18, Ls.10-14.]
Officer Cox made a decision to enter the residence to make
sure there were no other injuries or persons in the residence, and
to make sure the husband was not there. [Tr., p.19, Ls.7-12.]
There was a back door, and Officer Cox was concerned that the
husband could have returned. [Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.12; p.19,
Ls.9-12; p.20, L.25 - p.21, L.10.] Both Officer Cox and Officer
Rush entered the residence. [Tr., p.19, Ls.14-18.] They did not
have a warrant. [Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.2; Prelim. Tr., p.32, Ls.1417; p.73, Ls.19-21.] Both saw a marijuana grow operation in the
upstairs in plain view. [Tr., p.20, Ls.9-20; Prelim Tr., p.8, L.8 - p.9,
L.1; p.32, Ls.18-21.] The officers did not find other persons or any
other signs of injury. [Prelim. Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3.]
Police took photographs of the infant some time later. [Tr.,
p.23, Ls.22-24.] The photographs do not clearly show the marks
observed by the officers. [Tr., p.25, Ls.6-16.]
(R., pp.94-95.)

Tracy

was

charged

with

manufacturing

a

controlled

substance

(marijuana), possession of over 3 ounces of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.

(R., pp.50-51.)

Tracy's husband, Michael Tracy, was also

charged with similar crimes, and after the two cases were consolidated (R.,

2

p.13), he filed a motion to suppress, which Tracy joined.2 After a hearing, the
district court entered an order denying Tracy's motion to suppress, finding "there
were exigent circumstances, specifically concerns of injuries to persons within
the residence, that justified the warrantless entry into the residence." (R., p.98.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tracy entered a conditional guilty plea to
(felony) possession of marijuana in excess of 3 ounces, and the remaining
counts were dismissed. (R., pp.111-118; see generally 12/12/12 Tr.) The district
court ordered that judgment be withheld for one year and placed Tracy on
unsupervised probation for that period.

(R., pp.113-118.) Tracy filed a timely

notice of appeal from the district court's order. (R., pp.120-124.)

2

Michael Tracy's motion to suppress was augmented into the record on appeal
by this Court's order dated August 7, 2013. At the outset of the suppression
hearing, Tracy's counsel advised the court that he "would be joining in the motion
filed by Michael Tracy, [and] that he would not otherwise be filing any briefing."
(Tr., p.5, Ls.16-20.) Tracy does not appear to have filed her own motion to
suppress.

3

ISSUE
Tracy states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in concluding that exigent
circumstances justified a warrantless entry into Ms. Tracy's home?
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Tracy failed to show error in the district court's denial of her motion to
suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
Tracy Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Tracy asserts the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress,

contending there were no exigent circumstances in regard to the officers'
perceived injuries to the baby because: (1) there "was no yelling, no sounds or
other evidence of arguments or fighting" when officers arrived at the apartment;
(2) there was "no suspicion that the older child had any injuries[;]" and (3) Tracy
"gave them a perfectly reasonable and ultimately true explanation" for the red
marks on the baby. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
Tracy's arguments fail.

Application of the law to the facts shows the

district court correctly concluded that the officers' actions in this case were
constitutionally reasonable for

purposes of both

the federal

and

state

constitutions. 3

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

3

The district court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress is attached to this
Respondent's Brief as Appendix A.

5

Legal Standards Applicable To The Exigent Circumstances Exception To
Warrant Requirement
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently succinctly set forth the applicable law
in regard to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement as
follows:
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Without a warrant, searches and seizures within a home are
presumptively unreasonable. Kentucky v. King,_ U.S._, 131
S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011 ); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163
P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007). The State can overcome this presumption
by showing the government conduct fell within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. King,_ U.S. at_, 131
S.Ct. at 1856.
One such exception exists where exigent
circumstances "make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of danger to the
police or to other persons, inside or outside the dwelling, is one
type of exigency that may justify a warrantless entry. Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371,
375, 209 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct. App. 2009).
Accordingly, law
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render
emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an
occupant from imminent injury. Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375, 209 P.3d
at 672 (citing Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006)). The officer's subjective intent is irrelevant; instead, the
State has the burden to show an officer has an objectively
reasonable basis for believing a person within the house needs
immediate aid. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009).
State v. Ward, Docket No. 40069 (Idaho App. Oct. 22, 2013) (non-final decision).
The Idaho Court of Appeals also noted in Araiza that, "in several cases,
we have held that officers are not required to accept the assurances of someone
who insists that things are fine within a residence when other circumstances
indicate otherwise." Araiza, 147 Idaho at 376, 209 P.3d at 673; see State v.
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Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 850-51, 41 P.3d 275, 278-79 (Ct. App.
2001); State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17, 27 P.3d 873, 876 (Ct. App. 2001);
State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 433, 925 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Ct. App. 1996)
(warrantless entry justified although domestic battery victim told police "that
everything was now fine, that she had asked Sailas to leave, and that she did not
need the assistance of the police").

D.

Tracy Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression
Motion
Tracy asserts, "[h]aving seen all the occupants of the home, the police did

not have any reasonable basis to enter the home because they were concerned
that the occupants were injured. Even if the police had actually believed that the
baby was injured ... there was no exigency that would not have allowed them to
keep the baby with them in the doorway for a few minutes to see if Ms. Tracy's
explanation of the red marks would prove accurate." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
Contrary to Tracy's argument, based on the information objectively known by the
officers at the time, their entry into Tracy's apartment was justified.
In State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 292, 295, 62 P.3d 214, 216, 219 (2003)
138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214, law enforcement responded to a report of a man
who was collapsed on his front porch and unresponsive.
216.

kl

at 292, 62 P.3d at

A neighbor advised the officer that Barrett lived with his wife and two

children but that he had not seen them that day.

kl

Because Barrett did not

respond to questions about whether there was anyone else in the house, the
officers on scene "proceeded to Barrett's house and identified themselves loudly

7

several times, asking any persons inside to come to the front door."

Id.

"[G]etting no response and hearing nothing from inside," and concerned that
Barrett's wife and children could be inside and in need of medical assistance, the
officers entered the residence.

kl

Once inside, the officers did not find any

other occupants, but they did find paraphernalia and heroin in plain view. Id.
On appeal, Barrett challenged the denial of his suppression motion.
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217.

The Court of Appeals upheld the

district court's order denying Barrett's motion, concluding:
Under the totality of the facts and circumstances as known to
the police at the time that they entered Barrett's house, and
reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, we conclude that there
existed a compelling need for the police to enter. The state has
satisfied its burden to show that the risk of danger to persons inside
the dwelling, as then reasonably perceived by police, constituted an
exigency justifying that warrantless entry. Here, the state's claim of
exigency is not a mere pretext for an unlawful entry and search, but
the police officers legitimately believed, particularly in view of their
inability to discern the cause of the medical condition affecting
Barrett, that the life of any occupants of Barrett's house may very
well have been at stake. Because the police officers were still in
the process of searching downstairs for persons in need of
assistance, the exigent circumstances had not ceased to exist
when [an officer] observed the drug evidence in plain view in the
kitchen.
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294-95, 62 P.3d at 218-19.
As in Barrett, there was a "compelling need for the police to enter" Tracy's
residence.

Officer Cox testified at the suppression motion hearing about her

observations of Tracy's baby when Tracy brought the baby downstairs for the
officer to see:
And he was - he looked red, like his entire body. He had his arms, his stomach, his face, his legs, he had red marks, like
lines on his body. And, like I said, he had kind of an indentation. I
8

couldn't really tell what was wrong with the baby.
several marks on his body, and he was very red.
Q.

But he had

And what did you think when you saw the child?

A.

It caught me off guard because I hadn't seen - you know, it
was really from his face down to his leg area where he had red
marks and lines on him. So I was very concerned as to what
happened to the baby.

So then I started asking her, you know, "What's wrong with
your child?"
And she said, well, he was sleeping, and, you know,
eventually those will all disappear.
(Tr. p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.14.) When asked what she thought when she saw the
baby, Officer Cox testified:
I had thought that somehow, you know, if there was a
physical altercation between two people, being her and Michael,
that somehow maybe the baby was involved in the middle of that,
or maybe this was just directed towards the baby. Maybe this was
- had nothing to do with her. Maybe it was just the baby and the
male.
So I - you know, I really - I was just concerned based on
what I was seeing. I did not feel that a baby would look that way
after just waking up from a nap.
Q.

Did you think the baby was injured?

A.

Yes.

(Tr., p.18, L.18-p.19, L.5.)
Additionally, Officer Rush testified at the preliminary hearing to seeing the
same type of apparent injuries on Tracy's baby as Officer Cox, as the following
colloquy shows:
Q.

And what did you notice about that child?

A.

He appeared to have several abrasions on his body.
9

Q.

Was that immediately apparent to you?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And when you say abrasions, what do you mean?

Red marks. Body appeared to have several red marks, right
side of his head appeared to have what appeared to be injuries to
them, causing us to be concerned about the welfare of the child
and anybody else who may be in the residence.

A.

(Prelim. Tr., p.51, L.16- p.52, L.1.) When asked why he entered the residence,
Officer Rush testified:
Due to the (inaudible) of the situation, when we receive a call
stating that there's possibly some type of domestic disturbance
going on they believe that was physical, the person who answers
the door appears to be upset, somewhat nervous and reluctant to
let us inside of the residence, there's a child that appears to have
some types of injuries to it, it would be negligent on our part not to
enter that residence to check on the welfare of anybody else who
may be in it and also the possible apprehension of a suspect who
may be inside as well.
Q.
And so, in essence, it was for the safety of the individuals in
the home that you had entered the residence?

A.

Correct, yes.

(Prelim. Tr., p.53, L.13 - p.54, L.1.)
Based on the testimony presented at both the preliminary hearing and the
suppression motion hearing, the district court determined it was reasonable for
the officers to enter Tracy's home in order to find out if any other persons were
injured or in need of medical attention, explaining:
[T]the Court concludes that exigent circumstances existed such that
the warrant requirement was excused. Looking at the totality of the
circumstances known to the officers at the time of entry, and the
reasonable inferences drawn from those circumstances, the court

10

finds that there was a compelling need for the police to enter the
residence immediately.
A neighbor reported a physical altercation to a 911 operator,
stating that a female was being thrown and reporting loud sounds.
The neighbor reported past incidents of the same sort involving the
same couple. One of the police officers spoke to the reporting
party over the phone before arriving at the residence. While
Desirae attempted to assure the officer that there was no need for
police concern, other circumstances indicated there were reasons
for concern. While Desirae certainly had the right to decline to let
the police enter, her refusal to allow the officer into the residence
increased the concern that there may have been others needing
help inside, or that she did not want the police to know that her
husband had returned. The officers both observed what appeared
to be recent injuries on an infant. And while these marks were not
reflected in the later photographs, the court must evaluate the facts
known or concerns that existed at the time the officers decided to
enter the residence.
Based upon the foregoing, the court
concludes that there were exigent circumstances, specifically
concerns of injuries to persons within the residence, that justified
the warrantless entry into the residence. Accordingly, the motion to
suppress is denied.
(R., p.98.)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court correctly found
that the officers had a legitimate basis for concern that other people inside
Tracy's apartment could have been injured and in need of medical assistance.
Tracy has failed to demonstrate that law enforcement acted unreasonably
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution
by entering her home to ensure the safety of whoever might have been injured.
Because the officers were lawfully in the process of ascertaining the well-being of
any persons inside the apartment when they noticed the marijuana plants and
drug paraphernalia, there was no federal or state constitutional violation requiring

11

suppression of any evidence. Tracy has therefore failed to demonstrate error in
the district court's denial of her motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Tracy's motion to suppress.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of November, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701

. McKinney
ty Attorney General

JCM/pm
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APPENDIX A

~:?1t01r_o__
NOV 27 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cle
Sy MERSIHA TAYLOR
DePUTY

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICL4-L DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA

3

4
5

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

6

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-FE-2012-0002900
Case No. CR-FE-2012-0002901

7
8

vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

9

10
11

12
13

Desirae Tracy and Michael Tracy,
Defendant.
Before the Court is the motion to suppress filed by Defendants Desirae Tracy ("Desirae")
and Michael Tracy ("'Michael") (collectively the "Tracys"). For the reasons set forth below, the

14

motion will be denied.
15

Background and Prior Proceedings
16

17
18

On February 25, 2012, at approximately 9:45 a.m., Boise City Police Officer Billie Cox
was dispatched to 2834 S. Robert Lane, Boise for a domestic disturbance call. According to the

19

dispatcher, the calling party reported there was a female being thrown in the apartment, there

20

was lots of noise and sounds of banging from the apartment. According to the caller, there had

21

been prior disturbances and the caller was concerned for the children. According to the

22

dispatcher, the male had left the residence. Officer Cox arrived with another officer, Boise

23

Police Officer Kirk Rush.

24

Officer Cox knocked on the front door. Desirae answered the door. Desirae told Officer
25

Cox there had been an argument, but that everything was fine. Desirae told Officer Cox that her
26
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husband had left the residence, and that she was there with her two children. Officer Cox could
·1
2
3

see one child from the doorway. Officer Cox asked for permission to come in and make sure
everyone was okay. Desirae declined, but volunteered to bring the other child for Officer Cox to

4

observe. Desirae brought the other child, an eight (8) or nine (9) months old infant, to the front

5

door. Officer Cox could see red marks on the child's face, stomach, and arms. Officer Rush saw

6

the same red marks. Officer Cox questioned Desirae about the marks and Desirae said the marks

7

were from sleeping and would disappear.

8

Officer Cox made a decision to enter the residence to make sure there were no other

9

injuries or persons in the residence, and to make sure the husband was not there. There was a
10

back door, and Officer Cox was concerned that the husband could have returned. Both Officer
11

12
13

14
15

16
17

18

Cox and Officer Rush entered the residence. They did not have a warrant. Both saw a marijuana
grow operation in the upstairs in plain view. The officers did not find other persons or any other
signs of injury.
Police took photographs of the infant some time later. The photographs do not clearly
show the marks observed by the officers.
Desirae and Michael have been charged with manufacturing marijuana, a felony,
possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor.

19

There was a preliminary hearing on April 18 and 20, 2012. The preliminary hearing transcript is
20

in the Court file, and the Court has reviewed the testimony.
21

On July 16, 2012, Tracy filed a motion to suppress. Michael has joined in the motion.
22
23

The state filed an opposition on September 13, 2012. Tracy filed a brief in support of the motion

24

to suppress on _September 7, 2012. The Court conducted a hearing into the motion to suppress on

25'

October 31, 2012. The state was represented by Bi'ent A. Ferguson, Deputy Ada County

26
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Prosecuting Attorney. Tracy was represented by Deputy Ada County Public Defender Ransom
1
2
3

J. Bailey. Michael was represented by Randall S. Barnum. Officer Cox testified at the hearing.
The Court took the matter under advisement.
Discussion

4

5

It is settled that "[t]he Fourth Amendment, as well as Article I, § 17 of the Idaho

6

Constitution, protect the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

7

against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371,374,209 PJd 668,

8

671 (Ct. App. 2009). The entry into a home by police acting without a search warrant is

9

presumed to be unreasonable. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586, 100 S.Ct.
10

1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650 (1980) and State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,431, 925 P.2d
11

12

13

1125, 1130 (Ct.App.1996)).
However, there are a few recognized exceptions to this presumption. Id (citing Coolidge

14

v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2042-43, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 587-88

15

(1971) and State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218,984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999)). The state bears the

16

burden to show that a warrantless search fits within one of these exceptions. Id (citing State v.

17

Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 P.3d 327,331 (Ct.App.2008)).

18

One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the existence of "exigent

19

circumstances." State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 16, 27 P.3d 873, 875 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing
20

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) and State v.
21
22
23

Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224,225 (1993)). The risk of danger to other persons inside a
residence can constitute such an exigency justifying a warrantless entry. State v. Barrett, 138

24

Idaho 290,294, 62 P.3d 214,218 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho

25

847, 849-50, 41 P.3d 275, 278-79 (Ct.App.2001)).

26
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.I
The standard for the existence of exigent circumstances is "when the facts known to the
1
2
3

poHce at the time of the entry, along 'with reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, demonstrate a
'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. Araiza, 14 7 Idaho

4

371, 374, 209 P.3d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Pearson~Anderson, 136 Idaho at 849, 41

5

P .3d at 277); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 4 32, 434, 925 P .2d 1121, 1133 (Ct.App.1996). While it

6

is appropriate for a court to scrutinize any claim of exigency to ensure against pretext searches,

7

8

the court must also strive to avoid "second-guessing police decisions made in legitimate belief
that life may very well be at stake." Pearson-Anderson, above at 849, 41 P.3d at 279

9

(Ct.App.2001).
10

When evaluating the existence of exigent circumstances, a police officer is not required
11

12
13

to "accept the assurances of someone who insists that things are fine within a residence when
other circumstances indicate otherwise." Araiza above, at 376, 209 P.3d at 673 (citing State v.

14

Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 850-51, 41 P.3d 275, 278-79 (Ct.App.2001); State v.

15

Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17, 27 P.3d 873, 876 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho at 435,

16

925 P.2d at 1134.

17

18

Finally, if police are otherwise conducting a lawful activity, they may seize evidence in
plain view. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293-94, 62 P.3d 214, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2003).

19

Applying these considerations to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that exigent
20

circumstances existed such that the warrant requirement was excused. Looking at the totality of
21

the circumstances known to the officers at the time of entry, and the reasonable inferences drawn
22

23

24

from those circumstances, the court finds that there was a compelling need for the police to enter
the residence immediately.

25

26
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A neighbor reported a physical altercation to a 911 operator, stating that a female was
1:

2
3

being thrown a.rid reporting loud sounds. rne neighbor reported past incidents of the same sort
involving the same couple. One of the police officers spoke to the reporting party over the phone

4

before arriving at the residence. While Desirae attempted to assure the officer that there was no

5

need for police concern, other circumstances indicated there were reasons for concern. While

6

Desirae certainly had the right to decline to let the police enter, her refusal to allow the officer

7

into the residence increased the concern that there may have been others needing help inside, or

8

that she did not want the police to know that her husband had returned. The officers both

9

observed what appeared to be recent injuries on an infant. And while these marks were not
10

reflected in the later photographs, the court must evaluate the facts known or concerns that
11

12

13

existed at the time the officers decided to enter the residence. Based upon the foregoing, the
court concludes that there were exigent circumstances, specifically concerns of injuries to

14

persons within the residence, that justified the warrantless entry into the residence. Accordingly,

15

the motion to suppress is denied.

16
17
18
19

Conclusion
The Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

)-7

Dated this - - 20

day of November, 20 ~-

~~~

21
22

atrick H. Owen
District Judge

23
24
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4

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
ADA COlJNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

5

RANTIALL S. BARNUM
6
7

8
9

ATTORNEY AT LAW
380 S 4TH ST, STE 101
PO BOX2616
BOISE, ID 83701-2616
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
BY INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

10
11

12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH

20

i k of the District C

21
22

By

23
24

25
26

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS - PA~·-6

000099

